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If there is a dominant motif in Labour‟s approach to the conduct of domestic 
policy, it is „modernisation‟ – and its synonym, „reform‟. No set of institutions were 
more frequently and in a more thorough-going and sustained manner the object of 
modernisation than the public services. 1  „The reform of our public services‟, John 
Reid declared,  „is the crucible in which the future shape of the progressive centre-left 
politics is being forged (Reid, 2005)  It was, the Prime Minister‟s  Strategy Unit 
announced, „central to the achievement of the Government‟s objectives of greater 
social justice and a higher quality of life for everyone‟ (PMSU, 2006: 13). Under the 
Blair Government, Michael Barber former head of the PM‟s Delivery Unit proudly 
declared, the UK had emerged „as the most significant laboratory of learning at the 
cutting edge of public service reform anywhere in the world.‟ Indeed  „elsewhere in 
the world Blair's approach is viewed with a mixture of admiration and awe‟  (Barber, 
2007: 333).  For those who wondered, former No. 10 advisor Peter Hyman advised 
where „the [New Labour] “project” is heading, the renewal of public services provides 
the answer‟ (Hyman, 2005: 170).     
But what does „modernisation‟ – or reform – actually mean?  This has been the 
subject of intense debate and  controversy. For the Government it was all about  
ensuring „that everyone has access to public services that are efficient, effective, 
excellent, equitable and empowering – and that continually strive to cater to the 
needs of all citizens‟ (PMSU, 2006: 13).  From this perspective modernisation was 
the use of innovative methods to realise traditional values and goals: we can call this 
social democratic renewal.  For left-wing critics, in contrast, modernisation was, in 
practice, about marketisation (or commodification). For one commentator the   
„Blairite mantra of “modernization”‟ was „a slogan for actively dismantling the welfare 
state while facilitating the introduction of a new market-state under the dominance of 
private monopoly capital‟ (Ainley, 2004: 508). For another,  „what “reform” now 
means‟ was „marketisation and privatisation, whether frontally or incrementally 
introduced‟ (Hall, 2003: 22).  
Any programme of change is inevitably complex and multi-faceted and cannot (or 
can only rarely reduce) to a single ideological theme. This was particularly true of the 
host of legislative and other initiatives effecting the public services set in motion 
during the decade-long Blair Government. This chapter will, however, argue that an 
underlying pattern in Labour‟s approach to the public services (more specifically, 
secondary education and healthcare, the topics on which this chapter sill 
concentrate) can be uncovered. This will be called „New Labour Managerialism‟, a 
policy project with four interlinked constituent elements, tight performance 
management, choice, competition and diversity of supply 
The  chapter  will  proceed in the following way. Firstly, it briefly outlines the 
traditional Labour approach to the public services, labelled the „professional model‟ 
and the objections lodged to it by New Labour. Secondly, it explores the main 
contours of the Blair Government‟s alternative model, „New Labour Managerialism.‟ 
The third and longest section considers the extent to which this new approach has 
succeeded in promoting its key objective of higher quality, more equitably delivered 
services in the two central policy sectors of secondary education and healthcare. 
This is followed by a brief conclusion. 
  
                                                     
1
 For reasons of space this chapter focuses on the two public services where reform was 
most controversial within the Labour party, healthcare and education. 
 2 
2. The New Labour Challenge to the Professional Model  
Underpinning any strategy for organising the delivery of public services is a set  of 
„institutionalised domain assumption‟ (Ranson and Stewart, 1994: 42)  about how the 
public services should be organised and operate, how their goals can be most 
effectively promoted and how those who work within it can best be motivated.  These 
assumptions vary in a patterned way. Thus  (drawing here  loosely upon Rothstein) 
one can identify two models or ideal types of  organisational functioning. The first, 
the professional model,  places emphasis on the performance-enhancing effect of 
a professional code, shared norms, trusting relationships  and firm habits of co-
operation amongst organisational member. The second – which we call the 
managerial model – views organisations  as  incentive systems  which respond most 
effectively to competitive pressures and   to performance-related pecuniary rewards 
(Rothstein, 1998: 87). 
The former – the professional model – represented the standard social 
democratic approach to public services and has heavily influenced Labour‟s  thinking 
throughout its history.  Indeed a general confidence in „professional expertise and 
standards reinforced by the orderly controls of rational bureaucracy  were‟, 
underpinned „the social democratic state‟  (Ranson and Stewart, 1994: 11).  
Professionalism was understood as behaviour regulated by a professional code of 
conduct which specified the proper ends of the profession and committed  its 
members to deliver services according to needs in an impartial and equitable manner 
(Perkin, 1989: xiii, 17).  Married, in publicly-owned and run institutions, with  a strong 
spirit of public service, this code came to be dubbed  „the public service ethos‟, a 
concept which deeply permeated Labour  thinking „about the motivation, character 
and moral importance of the public sector within the political community‟ (Plant, 
2003: 561). Broadly-speaking, professional could be relied upon  to use the 
considerable discretion bestowed upon them to  do their utmost for those  they 
served, „trusted to deliver quality services in an efficient, responsive, accountable 
and equitable fashion‟ (Le Grand, 2007: 18.). 
Professionalism, though, has always had two aspects: on the one hand, the normative, that is  
expert provision of services regulated by professional standards and ethics and, on the other, 
the strategic, that is a form of occupational regulation used to advance the interests and 
institutional standards of professional members by controlling the market for their services  
(Sullivan , 2000: 673-4). In this latter aspect,   professionalism, legitimated by  the claim to the 
possession of  „a distinctive - and valuable - sort of expertise‟ operates as a  „basis for 
acquiring organisational and social power‟  (Clarke, Gewitz and McLaughlin, 2000: 8). 
 Policy experts (as well as, of course, seasoned and hard-nosed Labour 
politicians) working for Labour governments in the 1960s and 1970s were not 
unaware of this, and of the all t too real  gap between  the public sector ethos as 
prescriptive code and the actual conduct of those employed within the public sector. 
For example  Richard Titmuss (an advisor to the 1964-70 Labour government)  
expressed anxiety   that as the social services became „more complex, more 
specialized and subject to a finer division of labour‟ the role of professionals would 
grow and   „collectively, more power may come to reside in the hands of these 
interests‟ (quoted in Perkin, 1986:  14). Similarly  Brian Abel-Smith (close associate 
of Titmuss)  mulling over  his experiences  as a ministerial advisor lamented  that 
within the NHS  „the crucial power still rests with the key professionals both 
individually and collectively‟ (Abel-Smith, 1984: 180).  However – and this was the 
crucial point – whatever these problems  it was taken more or less as axiomatic  in 
Labour circles, that compared to those working in the profit-oriented market sector, 
public sector professionals would be more likely to be public-spirited, animated by  
a firmer  sense of the common good and more guided in their work by 
professional norms (Plant, 2003).  In short, it was supposed that those who 
worked within the public sector (in a professional capacity, like teachers, doctors 
and nurses)  did have a strong sense of the public interest and were „motivated, 
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at least in part, and for some of the time, by a sense of service and of civic duty‟  
(Marquand, 2004: 91). 
 But what if these assumptions  - of professional disinterestedness, of altruism 
-   were  incorrect?  What if  public sector professionals were, in fact, inspired by not 
dissimilar propulsions than their private sector counterparts? What if, in effect, 
professionalism was – in part at least – a  device for legitimating the entrenchment of 
producer interests?  For a variety of reasons (including their reading of the lessons of 
the 1974-1979 Labour government) the cohort of politicians – initially known as the 
„modernisers‟ and subsequently as „New Labour‟ – who reached prominence in the 
1990s  increasingly came to question established party verities.  They came to 
believe that , in the past , Labour had held   (in the words of a leading academic 
sympathiser)  distinctly „”dewy-eyed” visions of the state and public services‟ (Stoker, 
2007: 35). Doubts about the validity of the professional model took the form of two 
interlinked propositions. The first was a  waning   confidence „in the reliability of the 
public sector ethos as a motivational drive and a growing conviction that self-interest 
was the principal force motivating those involved in public services‟  (PMSU, 2006: 
59). The second was encapsulated in Milburn‟s declaration that „the inevitable 
consequence‟ of any monopoly, public as well as private, „was unresponsiveness, 
even indifference to user need‟ (Milburn, 2007: 10). Each of these will be briefly 
discussed.  
 
Professionalism and the  public service ethos as  motivational drives.  In a reversal 
of conventional Labour thinking  there was a growing reluctance to view public sector 
employees as notably more altruistic  than their colleagues in private firms.   Indeed 
the concept of the public service ethos  although often lauded for rhetorical purposes, 
was increasingly viewed with a sceptical eye. Ministerial experience, in particular, of 
negotiations with shrewd and tough-minded representatives of bodies such as  the 
BMA and the Royal Colleges helped them acquire  (as one government insider 
recalled)  „an extremely jaundiced view of the medical profession‟ (interview with a 
former Government advisor, 2006).  Traditional Labour faith in professionalism had 
been misplaced. In a system of what Blair called  „professional domination of service 
provision‟ professionals had acquired too much power „to define not just the way 
services were delivered but also the standards to which they were  delivered‟. The  
result  was too often a poor standard of service which left  service-users 
„disempowered and demoralised‟. (Blair, 2004).  In the private sector the need to 
capture custom  in highly competitive markets ensured a broad alignment between 
the self-interest of the producer of the needs of the consumer. No such restraints 
operated in the public sector – with the result that, too often,  services were  geared 
more to „ the interests of its providers than in those of its users‟ (Le Grand, 2007: 19).  
Reflecting upon his extensive governmental experience, Charles Clarke  commented 
that professional associations  had too often „focused upon defence of their own 
short-term interests despite obvious consumer concerns.‟ Far from rising to the 
manifold challenges facing the public services „Innovation and initiative have been 
rare and defensiveness and introversion are too often the norm‟ (Clarke, 2007: 134) 
with (Clarke, 2007: 131).  In the barbed words of one former Downing Street aide, 
despite much talk  of the public service ethos,    „there was not much sense of service 
to the public‟  (interview, Geoff  Mulgan).  
 
The problem of monopoly. The professional ethic „encodes an implicit bargain 
between professionals and the wider society‟ in which „controls over entry are 
exchanged by a commitment to abuse their monopoly position‟  (Marquand, 2004:  
55).   Leading policy-makers in the Blair Government became convinced that the 
bargain was not being respected.  Many of the serious weaknesses from which the 
public services suffered  - inefficiency, unresponsiveness, slowness to innovate, and 
inequity - stemmed (as a former No.10 health policy advisor put it) less from want of 
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cash than from the endemic flaw of monopoly provision  (Le Grand, 2006: 4-5). 
Central to mainstream social democratic thinking has been the concept of market 
failure – the inability of market to meet social needs and distribute resources and 
life-chances in an equitable manner. This remains an influential strand in New 
Labour thinking but it has been coupled with an equally strong accent on public 
sector failure, more specifically the absence of any embedded mechanisms for the 
enhancement of organisational performance.   Without the spur of competition and 
consumer pressure, public organisations tended to succumb to   bureaucratic inertia, 
a wasteful use of resources, rent-seeking behaviour, weak management and 
organisational arrangements designed to procure a more comfortable and rewarding 
life for public servants rather than for  those they served (Strategy Unit, 2006: 50). In 
short, by its nature, there were limits to the degree to which any sustained 
improvements in quality, efficiency and responsiveness could be achieved whilst a 
system of monopoly provision of public services continued. 
 
3. New Labour Managerialism 
How could these problems be resolved? In formulating their response, Blair 
Government policy-makers were  heavily influenced  by thinking associated with so-
called „New Public Management‟(NPM).  A definitive NPM tract was Osborne and 
Gaebler‟s celebrated text on  „entrepreneurial governance‟. (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992). This work  strongly criticised (in language which was to constantly recur in 
Blair Government pronouncements) the old-style „bureaucratic model‟ of public 
services which 'delivered the basic, no-frills, one-size-fits-all services' (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992: 14). It accepted  that the state remained a crucial agency for the 
pursuit of public goals but could only do so  if it was radically reshaped – if it learned 
to be „entrepreneurial.‟  The key characteristics of  „entrepreneurial governments‟ 
included the following 
#  They promote competition between service providers.  
# They empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, into the 
community.  
#  They measure the performance of their agencies, focusing not on inputs but on 
outcomes.  
# They redefine their clients as customers and offer them choices. 
# The prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms  (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1992: 19-20). 
  All these themes were assimilated into  the discourse and the practice of what 
I shall call New Labour Managerialism (NLM). Like professionalism  NLM defined „a 
set of expectations, values and beliefs about motivation and effective organizational 
performance – indeed it represented an avowed  challenge to it.  Thus  „a central 
issue in the managerialization of public services has been the concerted effort to 
displace or subordinate the claims of professionalism‟ (Clarke, Gewitz and 
McLaughlin, 2000: 9). NLM, however, should be carefully distinguished from the  
privatisation/marketisation approach.  Thus  it  was grounded in a strong commitment 
to a large and vibrant sphere of collective activity where  public goods such as 
healthcare and schooling  were provided in an equitable fashion according to need, 
free at the point of consumption and funded by progressive taxation (PMSU, 2007:  
10).  But – in a sharp break with traditional Labour thinking -  NLM was convinced  
that the techniques and norms of the private sector and, in some cases, the use of 
commercial providers, should be  harnessed to improve the delivery of public 
services.  „Old discredited dogmas about what should remain in the public sector and 
how the public sector operates‟  must, Brown insisted, be swept aside (Brown, 2003).  
  New Labour Modernisation – by the Government‟s second term - increasingly 
came to mean a mixture of four  main elements: performance management, choice, 
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competition and „diversity‟ of supply (especially the involvement of commercial 
firms).2  In Blair‟s summary: 
 
 „We must develop an acceptance of more  market-oriented incentives with a 
modern,  reinvigorated ethos of public service. We should  be far more radical 
about the role of the state as regulator rather than provider, opening up   
healthcare for example to a mixed economy under  the NHS umbrella….  We 
should also stimulate new  entrants to the schools market‟  (Blair, July 2003). 
 
The next section outlines the four main prongs of NLM. 3 
 
1. Performance Management. 
  Performance management can be defined as „a move towards more 
explicit and measurable (or at least checkable) standards of performance for public 
sector organizations, in terms of the range, level and content of services to be 
provided, as against trust in professional standards and expertise across the public 
sector‟  (Hood, 1995: 95).  The PM‟s Strategy Unit saw it as composed of four key 
characteristics: 
• „targets. These set specific ambitions for improvement in public services and 
provide publicly available performance information allowing comparisons of the 
performance of different providers‟ (PMSU, 2006: 22)   
• „regulation. This includes the setting of (national) minimum standards – which 
specify the quantity, quality and/or type of service providers should offer users;‟ 
• „performance assessment, under which providers are monitored and inspected and 
their performance assessed as to whether they are providing an acceptable level and 
quality of service.‟ 
• „intervention mechanisms, which are used to tackle failing or under-performing 
providers‟ (PMSU, 2006: 34. 
Performance management „was intended to provide a clear and rapid signal 
that improved outputs and outcomes were expected‟ from the very substantial 
additional expenditure being poured into the public services (PMSU, 2006: 22). At the 
summit of the performance management regime was the Prime Minister‟s Delivery 
Unit (PMDU). Headed by Michael Barber, it reported directly to the PM and was 
charged within monitoring and scrutinising key    public service targets in especially 
important or salient policy areas. (For an extensive discussion, see Barber, 2007).  
„By stating the target or goal publicly,‟ the head of the PM‟s Delivery Unit explained, 
„you create pressure on the system to deliver it and a timetable which drives the 
urgency‟ (Barber, 2007: 80). Tough targeting   „played a vital role in galvanising 
public services to deliver ambitious outcomes, building capacity and providing 
transparency‟ (PMSU, 2007: 24). It acted - the argument ran - as a battering ram to 
overcome entrenched inertia.   By  the same token,  through exposure  them to the 
intense  glare of publicity,   league tables placed pressure upon low achieving 
providers – schools, hospitals or whatever -  to improve their standard of 
performance.  The threat of intervention if adequate remedial measures were not 
taken would ram home the message that failure was not acceptable (Barber, 2007: 
334). 
However, it was acknowledged that performance management, especially 
when implemented through a command-and-control approach, could have 
detrimental effects.  It might „increase bureaucracy; stifle innovation and de-motivate 
                                                     
2
 There were other elements too but increasingly these were presented as the key motifs. See 
e.g.  Seldon, 2007: 42-4, 69-72, 109, 114-5,   
3
 This  section draws  upon Government documents, interviews conducted with a number of 
ministers and political advisors and a rapidly-growing literature. For details, see Shaw, 2007 
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front-line professionals by restricting initiative; and create perverse incentives.‟ 
(PMSU, 2006: 22). Hence in Labour‟s second term mechanisms of centralised 
control abated and the number of detail of targets was curtailed.  There was a 
significant shift towards „earned autonomy‟ in which control over organisation, 
management and finance was devolved to „good performers‟ (PMSU, 2006: 22, 43). 
Here crucial roles were perfumed by the three key (and interlinked) elements of the 
so-called „quasi-market‟, choice, competition and commercial involvement in supply.   
  
2. Choice. 
Labour‟s 1945 settlement was (in Tony Blair‟s words)   „largely state-directed and 
managed, built on a paternalist relationship between state and individual, one of 
donor and recipient [one in which] personal preferences were a low or non-existent 
priority‟   (Blair, 2002). The outcome was an asymmetrical power relationship in 
which user needs and preferences were often neglected. There were two available 
mechanisms to liberate the user – voice and choice.  The Government  introduced a 
series of measures to amplify voice, that is the involvement of  service users in 
decisions which affected their lives.  But, for a range of reasons (discussed in detail 
in Le Grand, 2007: 32-36)  it was persuaded that to  have a substantial impact voice  
had to be coupled with choice  - which  soon supplanted it as New Labour‟s favoured 
mechanism for enfranchising the „consumer‟.   
In fact, the extension of choice was designed to achieve multiple policy goals. 
Giving choice to the consumer meant that the producer had to gear services to what 
the user wanted. In a New Labour theme that became steadily more insistent, it 
promoted „personalisation‟ – that is the tailoring of services to the individual  needs 
and preferences of citizens (PMSU, 2007: 34). And it put the providers under 
relentless pressure to improve their actions. In short, by allowing users „to become 
more assertive customers‟, choice   helped „to ensure that public services respond 
more promptly and precisely to their needs‟ (PMSU, 2006: 65).    
By the beginning of the Blair Government‟s second term in office the concept 
of choice had emerged as a crucial organising principle in its public sector strategy. 
Thus in education the Government  legislated for a diverse range of schools, 
including faith schools, specialist schools, trust schools and City Academies amongst 
whom parents were increasingly free to choose. The underlying assumption was that 
„a quasi-market of increasingly differentiated and autonomous schools would…. 
foster competition and improvement of performance, while services would become 
more accountable when they were made to respond directly to the choices of 
individual consumers‟ (Ranson, 2003: 465). Similarly, in the NHS patients were 
increasingly offered choice of treatment in a range of hospitals (including private and 
ever overseas ones). By 2008 it was planned that all patients would be able to 
choose between any healthcare provider provided the price was reasonable and the 
quality met   NHS standards (Department of Health 2006: Ev 3. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Shaw, 2007: 100-103). 
 
 
3.  Competition.  
On its own however, the Government maintained, „the introduction of choice 
is unlikely to drive dynamic efficiency improvements‟ (PMSU, 2006: 66). For choice to 
work effectively producers must learn to compete for custom. Competition, Le Grand 
explains,  „is simply the presence in the public service of a number of providers, each of 
which, for one reason or another, are motivated to attract users of the particular service‟  
(Le Grand, 2007: 41).  As in the private sector so in the public, only when coupled with 
competition could choice „provide powerful and continuing incentives for service 
providers to improve efficiency and raise service quality for all‟ (PMSU, 2006: 66).  In 
the more competitive environment created by quasi-markets the more inventive, 
efficient and innovative providers would  flourish  at the expense of their more 
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sluggish,  less efficient counterparts offering a lower standard of service (Dawson 
and  Dargie, 2002: 36). Faced by loss of market share and shrinking income inferior  
suppliers would either have to raise their game – or face the consequences. (Le 
Grand, 2007: 43) 
All this required   a system in which provider funding was related to demand for 
services. For this reason a fundamental aspect of the New Labour reform programme 
was to institute systems by which resource allocation was, at least in part, a function 
of user demand. In the NHS – to take the best example of this – this took the form of 
Payment by Results.  Under the traditional system of NHS financing through block 
grants, Tony Blair claimed,  „there were no financial incentives to treat more patients, 
nor for hospitals to cut their costs.  This meant that the inefficient hospitals would 
have little incentive to improve…  Nor was there any incentive to be efficient‟ (Blair,  
2006).  Under Payment by Results (PbR), introduced in stages from 2002, hospitals 
were reimbursed for the activity they actually carried   out, using a tariff of fixed prices 
that reflected national average costs. (Maybin, 2007: 1)  PbR would reward efficiency 
since where costs were lower than the tariff, the surplus could be retained by the 
hospital and reinvested. Further, under the system of uniform prices, an essential 
element in the PbR package, providers would have to compete on quality rather than 
price (Maybin, 2007: 4). In education although no  reform as such sweeping as PbR 
was introduced there were  a range of measures which ensured that schools with the 
heaviest demand benefited financially by linking funding settlements to enrolment 
size. 
 
4.  Commercial involvement 
There  was, the Strategy Unit argued, „no point in empowering citizens if their 
expressed preferences cannot be met „ and this entailed „a broad base of suppliers‟ 
(PMSU, 2007: 44). A central tenet of New Labour thinking was  that  public services 
did not   have to be delivered by public organizations. What mattered was that key 
services (such as schooling and healthcare) should be provided according to need 
and free at the point of consumption.  The question of who exactly supplied – 
whether public, private or voluntary organizations, or some combination of them – 
should be judged an strictly pragmatic grounds. A distinction was thus made between 
two functions of the state, as direct provider and as  commissioner  (and regulator)  
of services.   Rather than insisting on its right to provide all services directly, „the 
enabling state‟ should be  to „help to empower citizens by introducing much greater 
diversity of service provision – extending the choices available to users and ensuring 
that the best providers (whether from the public, private or voluntary sector) are used‟ 
(PMSU, 2007a:14). 
The  increased diversity of providers, the Government insisted,  would shake 
up old-ways of doing things,  promote innovative practice, act as a spur to efficiency 
and foster greater responsiveness.  Although much was made of involving the so-
called „third sector‟ – voluntary organisations and charities – in public service delivery 
the cutting edge of the Government‟s approach, and perhaps the single most 
controversial item in the  strategy of public sector reform,  was increasing reliance on 
the private sector.  The Office of Public Services Reform  was confident that 
„widening the market to create more suppliers of public services‟  - greater  
„contestability‟ in the jargon –  would „drive up performance, improve  the quality of 
management and secure more  value for  money.‟  It was vital for productivity growth 
since, the OPSR noted,  „in the private sector as much as half of all productivity gains 
come from new entrants to the market, as opposed to incremental improvements 
from existing companies‟  (OPSR, 2002: 24). All this constituted open defiance of one 
of Labour‟s traditional totems and there was furious opposition, especially from the 
unions.  But Tony Blair was adamant. „If we back off from this one,‟  he declared 
defiantly in June 2001,  „we might as well pack our bags and walk out  of   this 
 8 
building now‟. „Part of any reform package‟ had to be „partnership with the private or 
voluntary sector‟ (quoted in Seldon, 2007: 42, 69).  
The most  contentious  example of this policy was the introduction of private 
providers into the delivery of NHS healthcare. In 2002 the first wave of so-called 
„Independent Sector Treatment Centres‟ (ISTCs) was commissioned. Under ISTC 
agreements private providers were contracted to carry out relatively simple, high–
volume surgical procedures, initially in the fields of ophthalmics and orthopaedics.   
The intention was that the private sector would  provide up to 15 per cent of all 
affected  procedures by 2008 (Health Select  Committee, 2006: 7; Guardian January 
26, 2005).   Only with   the recruitment of  fresh and eager  entrants, it was argued, 
could a truly competitive market be created (Department of Health 2006:  Ev 2-3; 
Strategy Unit, 2006: 54). The Government removed any doubts about its enthusiasm 
for a mixed economy of healthcare when a Health Department White Paper 
published in January 2006 announced a plan to open up primary care to commercial 
bidders  (Guardian   January 31, 2006). A further step was taken when private firms 
were invited and encouraged to bid to secure contacts for the commissioning of 
services at primary trust level, thereby performing functions which previously had 
been discharged solely by public institutions. In education, the introduction of private 
(and „third sector‟) providers proceeded at a tardier pace. The key initiative here was 
the expansion of the „City Academy‟ programme. In return for providing up  10% of 
the capital costs, capped at a contribution of £2 million, „external sponsors‟  from the 
business sector, voluntary  organisations and other public sector institutions (e.g. 
universities) were given a considerable say over how a City Academy was run 
(Shaw, 2007:  68-70). 
 
4. The Impact of New Labour Managerialism 
There has been much debate – at times at some emotional tempo - in the 
Labour party and amongst academic commentators about how effective „New Labour 
Managerialism‟ has been in achieving its ostensible goals. For its harshest critics on 
the left, it was essentially a programme of marketisation.  Thus in healthcare (the 
charge ran) the NHS    was being „dismantled and privatised…and commodified. The 
institutions that made the NHS strong, economical and popular are being 
dissolved…In their place are market mechanisms: invoicing, customers, segmented 
risk pools, legal contracts, and a myriad of competing suppliers‟ (Pollock, 2004: 1, 
214, 215). In education, similarly, increasingly „everything was for sale‟ with the 
displacement of use values by exchange values and the increasing intrusion of 
consumer culture (Ball,  2004). For more sympathetic voices, in contrast, talk of 
privatisation was „nonsense‟. The reforms were  „in the means, not the aims: market 
dynamics are to be harnessed in the service of equity and social solidarity‟   (Klein, 
2006: 411). 
Given the relatively short time span - it takes a number of years for legislation 
to be implemented and for their effects to be fully assessed – and the often 
staggering complexity of the issues involved any judgment on the impact of the many 
initiatives associated with NLM necessarily has to be tentative.  Because this chapter 
is primarily concerned with Labour thinking – rather than with  general issues of 
public policy – as well as for reasons of space the focus in the discussion that follows 
will be on the central question of   whether  the NLM project of public service reform 
has advanced the Labour Government‟s  two crucial objectives:  greater equality of 
access to public services and a sustained improvement in their quality. 
   
(1).  Greater equality of access? 
In the market the quality and quantities of what people buy is principally a 
function of their purchasing power.  Given that income, and hence purchasing power, 
is unequally distributed, markets are thus inherently inegalitarian. But quasi-markets, 
of the sort introduced by the Government, differed from conventional markets in a 
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crucial respect.   The supply of services did not respond to purchasing power since 
consumers did not individually procure services. Rather the government acted as an 
agent on their behalf. Thus though providers compete for their custom,    users   „do not 
come to a quasi-market with their own resources to purchase goods and services, as 
with a normal market. Instead the services are paid for by the state but with the money 
following users' choices through the form of a voucher, an earmarked budget or a 
funding formula‟ (Le Grand, 2007: 41).  In effect purchasing power was equalised in that 
the value of each choice (user preference) was a function of need (as determined by 
public authorities) and not ability to power. Where prices were extensively used   (as in 
the NHS system of Payment by Results) they were administered  - set by public 
authority – rather than reflecting the balance of supply and demand. (Barber, 2007: 
335).  For one of the architects of the quasi-market in healthcare, Julian Le Grand, it 
was  „a fundamentally egalitarian device, enabling public services to he delivered in 
such a way as to avoid most of the inequalities that arise in normal markets from 
differences in people's purchasing power‟ (Le Grand, 2007: 41)   
However, this broad claim has been much contested. The key issue – for 
many critics - is the social distribution of the capacity to make informed decisions. 
They argued that choice and competition mechanisms would inevitably skew 
services in favour of the more knowledgeable, educated and confident: that is the 
professional and managerial middle classes. „The articulate and self-confident middle 
classes‟, Roy Hattersley contended,  „will insist on the receipt of the superior 
services. The further down the income scale a family comes, the less likely it is to 
receive anything other than the residue which is left after others have made a choice‟ 
(Hattersley, 2005).  Those able to exploit choice most effectively would be  service-
users from more comfortable and more highly-educated backgrounds „with the 
capability, time and resources to make informed and determined choices‟ (Rustin, 
2004: 93). The logic of a quasi-market would therefore be to entrench middle class 
advantage.    
The Government, in contrast, insisted that it had been monopoly public 
provision that  had signally failed to narrow stubbornly  high levels of inequality in the 
distribution of public services. This was not by chance.  In the state sector, in the 
absence of choice,  it was the  „more articulate, more confident, and more persistent‟ 
middle class that  gained most from „voice‟ mechanisms (Le Grand, 2006a). 
Furthermore, the more affluent sections of the middle class always enjoyed the 
option of choice by buying into privately-supplied healthcare and education. The  
Government was giving to all the opportunities of choice which had until now been 
the prerogative of the wealthier (Blair, 2003). 
Adjudicating between the two positions in no easy task. Insufficient data  has 
as yet accumulated  and not enough time has elapsed for researchers to assess the 
cumulative effects of Government reforms (Lewis  and  Dixon,  2005: 13).  In 
addition, it is extremely difficult to disaggregate the impact of one particular set of  
variables – the effects of Government policies -  from a host of others (Smithers, 
2007: 383).   As a result, no consensus view has emerged.  To take – for illustrative 
purposes – the issue of secondary education.  On the one hand, Gorard and Fitz 
found „no evidence… to link education markets with increasing concentrations of 
disadvantaged children in some schools and their absence in others‟ (Gorard and 
Fitz, 2006: 281). Indeed, there was evidence of „some narrowing of the attainment 
gap between the most deprived and least deprived‟ (Hill, 2007a: 271). On the other, 
research reviewed by Glatter indicated that  „competitive markets in schooling 
promoted social polarisation‟ (Glatter, 2004: Ev 6 ).  Machin and Stevens similarly 
found that a  „quasi-market in education has actually reinforced existing inequalities 
in the education system. Children from lower income and social-class 
backgrounds…are now even more concentrated in less-well-performing schools‟ 
(Machin and Stevens, 2004: 164; see also Harris and Ranson, 2005: 574; Besley and 
Ghatak , 2003:  245; Shaw, 2007: 73-76). Equally, no clear agreement has emerged 
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over the impact of choice and competition on  equity in the delivery of NHS 
healthcare (Thorlby and Turner, 2007; Shaw, 2007:111-113). 
   
2. Improving the quality  goods of public services 
 What of the debate over the second key objectiive, bolstering standards in 
public services?  There is no doubt that there have been some notable 
accomplishments. In education, schools are better funded, better-staffed, better-
housed and given better facilities, class sizes have fallen, literacy and numeracy 
standards risen  and overall pupil performance (as measured examinations) steadily  
improved (Johnson, 2004: 195-6; Barber, 2007: 266).  Similarly in an audit of the 
Blair Government‟s record on healthcare published in 2005 the   King‟s Fund 
reported  „huge progresses in the reduction of waiting times and „more and better 
services‟ (King‟s Fund, 2005:  8). For example, in 1998 more than a quarter of 
patients waiting for elective surgery in England faced a delay of at least six months for 
surgery, and over 4% for more than a year. By 2005, there was no one waiting longer 
than a year and only 5% waiting longer than six months (Le Grand, 2007: 24; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006: 526).   
A necessary condition for higher service quality has been the major upswing in 
expenditure. Thus, in healthcare, there was an average annual increase in real terms 
in health spending of 7.4% between 2002/03 and 2007/08 (Department of Health, 
2003: 4).  Equally in education between 1996-7 and 2006-7   public expenditure rose 
from 4.8 per cent of GDP to 5.7 per cent   (Smithers, 2007: 379).   But the sufficient 
condition was „modernisation‟. Consumer pressures in a more competitive setting, in 
particular, was seen as the crucial lever for progressive performance enhancement.  
Here, in developing its quasi-market reform programme,  the Government was faced 
with the problem of designing  an effective mechanism to ensure that the dynamic of 
market competition could be replicated in the public sector. How could consumer 
pressure be effectively exerted in the absence of a properly functioning price 
mechanism to guide choice? One response was for the state itself to step order by 
supplying information and advice which would enable the user to make an informed 
choice between rival providers. Thus in the NHS a scheme of healthcare advisors    
was introduced (PMSU, 2007: 35; Barber, 2007: 336.; Le Grand, 2007: 84-5, 117-9). 
However, there were plainly limits to  how far this could extend without creating a 
new – and given the type of expertise required – very expensive layer of officialdom. 
What was clearly required was some form of price surrogate - a   mechanism which 
could  in some way  mimic the role of prices summary quality indicators.   
 In fact, the mechanism had already been created (in embryo) by the Tories, 
published information about  comparative  provider performance. Under New Labour, 
the practice was developed and extended taking the form, in secondary education, of 
league tables, the  star ratings system in the NHS and, for universities, the Research 
Assessment Exercise. The aim was to „measure current or past performance of 
comparable service units against one another‟    (Hood, 2007: 95) The underlying 
principle was that the desire to attract custom by securing  a higher place in a 
competitive  ranking system would  drive up standards (Albury, 2007: 150).    For 
example, school league tables acted as price proxies by - in Blair‟s words - giving  
„parents the information that has enabled them to make objective judgements about a 
school‟s performance and effectiveness‟ (Blair, 2005).    
But ranking systems would only act as reliable  price surrogates to the extent 
that they were fashioned out of quantitative indicators  which accurately measured 
comparative performance.  „Clear performance criteria and good-quality performance 
information‟ – as a senior adviser in the Prime Minister‟s Strategy Unit reported - 
were „key prerequisites for a well-functioning market (Albury, 2007: 154).  For this, 
two conditions had to be met: (1) that  the performance indicators  used to compile 
ranking orders accurately measured  what they were  supposed to measure (2) that 
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performance indicators  provided „a complete and accurate picture of overall 
performance‟ (Bevan  and Hood, 2006: 520). 
 The first point will be (for reasons of space) briefly discussed. The  key issue 
was the robustness and objectivity of performance indicators. Here the danger was 
that given so much depended upon one‟s place in a ranking order there would 
always be a temptation to engage „gaming‟, that is the management  of statistics to 
place a favourable gloss on performance  (Bevan  and Hood, 2006: 521). For 
instance – as a former top Government advisor reported – pupils might be 
discouraged from taking  subjects in which it was harder to score a good grade (hill, 
2007a: 279). Precisely how large a problem this is  difficult to establish since, as 
Hood points out,  „we know relatively little about the validity and reliability of complex 
composite performance measurement systems‟ (Hood, 2007: 100. For a useful 
general discussion see also Hood, 2006: 517. For secondary schooling, Smithers 
2007: 333-9; higher education Broadbent, 2007: 194 and the NHS Bevan  and Hood, 
2006: 533). 
The second point  - the extent that the quality of service provision can be 
accurately measured – is more fundamental. It is generally agreed that some form of 
performance measurement is essential to establish accountability, assess standards 
and single-out cases of poorly-delivered services (Gleeson  and Husbands, 2003: 
50).  The issue is the scale of and weight assigned to performance measurement. 
Referring to schooling, the  chief executive of the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority (Ken Boston)  commented that  „no other country devotes as much time and 
expertise to developing measures of pupil progress‟ (quoted in Hill, 2007a: 279). 
Indeed,  Hood contends that the Blair Government ‘arguably took the target 
approach …to a point hardly seen since the demise of the USSR‟ (Hood, 2007: 96). 
The underlying rationale is that the quality of a service can be established with some 
accuracy and precision by constructing measured indicators of performance – 
preferably some form of „metric‟ – which, in turn, can be used to compare relative 
performance. Hence the so-called  „audit explosion‟ (Marquand, 2004: 111-12)  as a 
myriad of organisations were created „engaged in checking, measuring and 
appraising the performance of public sector workers measured against targets and 
performance indicators‟ (Gleeson  and Knights, 2006: 282).    
 The point at issue is the extent to which the quality of the services being 
provided can be accurately measured. This has been queried by a number of 
commentators. The argument, in brief, runs like this: unlike in consumer markets.    
public services are complex, multi -dimensional and do not lend themselves to being 
broken down into quantifiable discrete „products.‟  As  Smithers observes, „test and 
exam scores are not a product in the sense that barrels of oil and baked tins are: 
they are surrogates for the education we hope are taking place‟ (Smithers, 2007: 
382. See also Ranson and Stewart, 1994: 28). The result of the importance assigned 
to numerical indicators is that incentives are imparted to concentrate effort  on the 
measurable at the expense of the non- (or not easily) measurable. „For example, 
good education involves students being able to achieve high scores in standardized 
tests, but also encouraging a spirit of creativity, curiosity, and inculcation of good 
values. The former is easy to measure, but if teachers are rewarded just on the basis 
of the performance of students in tests, this might lead to an excessive focus on test-
taking skills at the expense of the other components of a good education‟ (Besley 
and Ghatak , 2003:  239. See also Gleeson  and Husbands, 2003: 502. For higher 
education see Broadbent, 2007: 195).  
Similar criticism has been made of the heavy reliance on measured 
performance  in the NHS.   Summarising recently published research on this topic, 
the editor of the British Medical Journal concluded that: 
„Focusing on process rather than clinical outcomes reduces clinical complexity 
to a series of boxes for ticking and encourages overtreatment and 
medicalisation…. Given the complexity of health care, what are the chances 
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of coming up with a single overall measure of performance? …. people 
prioritise. This means that performance on one measure may tell you little 
about performance on others‟ (Godlee, 2007) 
 In short,  given that organisations are rewarded (or penalised) on the basis of 
measured performance energies are likely to be lavished on scoring well (hitting 
targets and so forth) on the measures.  (Besley and Ghatak , 2003:  239). Reducing 
waiting list for treatment for life-threatening illnesses, such as cancer, would be 
widely regarded as a valid measure of performance as long as the statistical 
evidence is robust. The same would apply to literacy and numeracy targets.  
However there are a host of other indicators whose reliability, generalisability and 
significance may be disputed. More fundamentally, there are  activities that simply 
cannot be accurately measured, or at least not without a major engagement of 
energy and resources, because they are intrinsically qualitative in character, for 
example the development of intellectual curiosity or aesthetic sensibility. Indeed, 
there may be an inverse relationship between „objective‟ statistical indicators -  e.g. 
measures of productivity – and the actually quality of service supplied, whether 
assessed in terms of professional judgment or user appreciation. For instance, the 
care and attention that might be committed by a clinician to easing the anxieties of a 
patient may – because time is not being effectively „utilised‟ – translate into lower 
productivity scores. As  the editor of the British Medical Journal put it,   
„There can be little doubt that we must constantly evaluate how we are doing, 
against each other and over time. The problem is that the things that are 
easiest to measure are almost inevitably the least important, and vice versa…. 
Compassion and dignity are hard to measure‟ (Godlee, 2007). 
 
Conclusion 
The „New Labour Managerialism‟, is has been suggested, amounted to a 
reasonably coherent package of ideas and policies. Initially it evolved slowly and 
haltingly, but gained pace and impetus in Blair‟s second term as „public sector reform‟ 
emerged as the central thrust of the New Labour project.  Several of its most 
distinctive and controversial elements, including the accent on competition, choice 
and private involvement did not (so the press briefings suggest) have the full support 
of Gordon Brown.  So would New Labour Managerialism survive the Brown 
succession intact?  
Initially it seemed not. The expansion of the ISTC programme was halted and 
reports circulated that the new Prime Minister wishes, if not to turn back the tide, at 
least to proceed with far more circumspection.  But after a period of initial doubts and 
hesitations it became evident that Brown was no less enthusiastic a proponent (for 
whatever reasons) of NLM than his predecessor. And in a heavily-trawled and  
widely-publicised article in the Financial Times he  promised  „a greater diversity of 
providers, more choice and in many areas more competition‟. He made his position 
on public service reform  unequivocally clear: „there can be no backtracking on 
reform, no go-slow, no reversals and no easy compromises.‟ He promised a faster 
expansion of the contentious City Academies programme, more personal budgets 
and more participation by private sector in the delivery of NHS care (Financial Times 
March 9 2008). There will be, so to speak, no turning back. 
 
Labour‟s approach to the public services has  thus  undergone a major 
recasting. Trust and confidence in the motivational force of professional codes and 
the public service ethos has ebbed and much more confidence is now reposed in the 
energising and bracing effects of competition  and pecuniary incentives (Hill, 2007: 
248).  „New Labour Managerialism‟ is not – this chapter has suggested – comparable 
to new right-style privatisation and marketisation programmes. To the contrary, there 
has been a major hike in the monies assigned to the public services, especially 
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healthcare and education. The decade-long Blair Government witnessed a major 
refurbishment in the fabric of the welfare state.  
 However, some of the means used to renovate the public services have been  
 - from a traditional social democratic perspective – highly controversial, notably the 
systematic importation  of methods, disciplines and techniques drawn from the 
market sector. For the Government  the effect will be to realize „our progressive and 
social democratic aspirations‟ such as „a higher quality of life for all, greater social 
justice, empowerment for individuals, families and communities, and an enhanced 
public realm‟ (Albury, 2007: 145-6. See also Le Grand, 2006).   Critics, in contrast, 
fear  that equality and quality will  both suffer and that the ultimate impact of efforts 
to render public services more „answerable to the pressure of competition and the 
incentive of relative advantage in the marketplace‟ will  be to fragment, corrode  and 
devalue them  (Ranson, 2003: 470. See also Gleeson  and Knights, 2006: 281).Only 
the passage of years will tell which of these two predictions will prove more accurate. 
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